















Submitted to the graduate degree program in Anthropology and the Graduate Faculty of the 































The Thesis Committee for Silvia María Sánchez Díaz 





































My thesis is a study of the obstacles that prevent development practitioners from 
prioritizing beneficiaries’ needs when implementing development projects in the Ch’orti’ Maya 
area. Historically, structural dynamics have prevented the Ch’orti’ population from meeting their 
basic needs. While working in the region for six months in 2011 and 2012, I discovered that such 
structures remain despite efforts of local development agencies to promote a better quality of life 
through project implementation. Throughout eight weeks of ethnographic fieldwork in the 
summer of 2015, I interviewed ten local development practitioners and seven local experts, and I 
found that local development agencies in the Ch’orti’ area are constantly adapting to funding 
fluctuation. In efforts to continue to receive funding, development practitioners engage in a 
series of strategies that deprioritize beneficiaries’ needs. In addition, competition for funding and 
beneficiaries polarizes local development agencies, and prevents them from collaborating with 
each other or coordinating efforts. What is worse, resources development practitioners have at 
their disposal are sometimes contingent upon politicians or donors benefitting from 
interventions. Thus, development projects have treated the symptoms but not the causes of food 
scarcity and malnutrition in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. My analysis suggests that, beyond 
determining which agency will implement which project, donors foster the emergence of service 
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SCARCE FOOD, ABUNDANT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
 
My thesis is a study of the obstacles that prevent development practitioners from 
prioritizing beneficiaries’ needs when implementing development projects in the Ch’orti’ Maya 
area. The topic is inspired by a contradiction I discovered while working in the region for six 
months in 2011 and 2012: that the benefits of myriad development projects accompany food 
scarcity, lack of resources, and unmet basic needs. That is, challenges to Ch’orti’ subsistence 
remain despite efforts of local development agencies to promote a better quality of life through 
project implementation.  
Historically, discrimination, inequalities, and lack of access to resources have prevented 
the Ch’orti’ population from meeting their basic needs. Most households in the region survive on 
a day-to-day basis and only barely get by. With no access to drinkable water and a diet of only 
tortillas and beans three times a day, Ch’orti’ households are periodically exposed to chronic 
food shortages that increase cases of premature death of preventable causes in the region. 
Children continuously experience episodes of severe diarrhea and dehydration, and adults often 
share personal stories of abandonment, loss, and misfortune. Beyond experiencing preventable 
premature death and social suffering, Ch’orti’ people are sometimes blamed for their inability to 
feed themselves. Indeed, doctors and nurses sometimes accuse parents of neglect when they are 
unable to feed their children.  
During my first visits to the Ch’orti’ Maya area, I found it paradoxical that food scarcity, 
lack resources, and unmet basic needs were surrounded by abundant development symbols, 
objects, and activities. All the households I visited were beneficiaries of multiple development 
interventions. The roof top of their houses, the latrine, the sink, the stove, the metal silos, clothes, 
school supplies, and farm animals had been donated by development agencies in efforts to 
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promote a better quality of life. The parents I met would routinely participate in a variety of 
workshops and community assemblies organized by development agencies, and many children 
were sponsored by an international agency such as World Vision and Save the Children. What is 
more, multiple billboard posts advertised the work of particular development agencies in both 
paved and unpaved roads, sometimes including references to specific projects implemented in 
the area (see Figure 1). Although it is easy to find a variety of offices and cars belonging to 
development agencies when traveling through the region, development projects do not seem to 
impact beneficiaries’ historical vulnerability to discrimination, inequalities, and lack of access to 
resources.  
Figure 1: Billboard Posts Advertising the Work of Local NGOs at the Entrance to Jocotán. 
 
Pictures: Silvia Sánchez Díaz (June 2015). 
 
My thesis explores development projects’ inability to impact historical discrimination, 
inequalities, and lack of access to resources. Throughout eight weeks of ethnographic fieldwork 
within the local development network, I found that development practitioners encounter a variety 
of obstacles that prevent them from prioritizing beneficiaries’ needs. On the one hand, funding 
fluctuation inhibits long-term planning and collaboration among local agencies. On the other 
hand, donors and local politicians ensure a portion of development funding benefits them before 
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practitioners get to implement projects. Although decades of experience have taught local 
development practitioners that beneficiaries need more holistic, long-term interventions, funding 
fluctuation does not allow projects to seek structural changes. In addition, competition for 
funding and beneficiaries among development agencies has prevented coordination and 
collaboration. Thus, development projects have become attempts to create ‘easy ways out of 
poverty’. On the other hand, development practitioners have witnessed cases of politicians using 
development funding for seeking political support, and donors establishing spending 
requirements that benefit industries connected to them. Local development practitioners describe 
such practices as cases of ‘slicing development resources like a cake’. In short, institutional 
needs, competition among agencies, and political aims create incentives for development 
practitioners to deprioritize beneficiaries’ needs when implementing projects. Thus, projects 
have treated the symptoms, but not the causes of food scarcity and malnutrition in the region.  
In this chapter, I analyze food scarcity in the Ch’orti’ Maya area as a form of structural 
violence. In the second chapter, I recount two waves of project proliferation in the region. In the 
third chapter, I describe the theoretical framework ethnographies of aid offer for analyzing 
development interventions, and I describe my methodology. In the third chapter, I explain how 
funding fluctuation inhibits long-term planning and collaboration among local agencies. In the 
fourth chapter, I describe how donors and local politicians sometimes ensure a portion of 
development funding benefits them before practitioners get to implement projects. In the fifth 
chapter, I discuss the challenges that emerge due to issues in funding allocation, and I mention 
some implications for the literature.  
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Food Scarcity and Malnutrition as Forms of Structural Violence 
 
Ch’orti’ people have suffered the impossibility of providing basic needs and a 
permanent state of deprivation since time immemorial – Oficina de los Derechos 
Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (Office for the Human Rights from the 
Archbishop in Guatemala), 2009.  
 
…if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is 
committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation – 
Galtung 1969, 171. 
 
Although structural violence is not the topic of my research, recognizing that Ch’orti’ 
people suffer structural violence was a relevant step toward better understanding the context in 
which development practitioners work. Because Ch’orti’ people suffer structural violence, 
promoting a better quality of life unavoidably requires challenging the inequalities that shape 
food scarcity and malnutrition in the region. In other words, even though Ch’orti’ families often 
benefit from development projects, the inequalities that shape food scarcity in the region persist 
and Ch’orti’ people continue to suffer disproportionately from malnutrition.  
Indirect or structural violence occurs when unequal power produces unequal life chances. 
In other words, beyond physical harm, violence occurs when policies and social arrangements 
result in particular suffering and injuries – in this case, malnutrition – and the consequences of 
violence cannot be traced back to concrete perpetrators (Galtung 1969). As mentioned earlier, 
Ch'orti' people disproportionately suffer malnutrition because discrimination, inequalities, and 
lack of access to resources prevent them from meeting their basic needs. Beyond experiencing 
social suffering through abandonment, loss, and misfortune, Ch’orti’ people are sometimes 
blamed for their inability to feed themselves. Ch’orti’ people suffer structural violence because 
they have no power to decide over the distribution of resources, and are yet held accountable for 
the results of inequality. 
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Medical anthropologist Paul Farmer (2004) recognized the production of poor health and 
premature death through historically given, economically driven processes that constrain 
individual agency. As many epidemics in the world, malnutrition and chronic food shortages 
have periodically increased cases of premature death of preventable causes. In this section, I 
explain the national and regional inequalities that explain labor exploitation and state neglect in 
the Ch’orti’ area. Then, I describe the effects of structural violence in the Ch’orti’ region: 
periodic chronic food shortages, premature death of preventable causes, and sacrifices in Ch’orti’ 
autonomy and cultural integration. 
In Guatemala, the government has failed to provide for the wellbeing of the indigenous 
populations because a small elite formed of twenty-two families has historically controlled the 
resources and priorities of state. The Guatemalan oligarchy controls agriculture, industry, and 
commerce, and has a heavy hand in molding national ideology. As Metz (2006, 185) mentions, 
three of four of Guatemala’s past presidents –León Carpio, Arzú, and Berger– belong to such 
elites. Among the Guatemalan oligarchy, contradictory but complementary claims of both 
laziness and physical endurance have justified labor exploitation. In her study about  
  Among the Guatemalan oligarchy, contradictory but complementary claims of both 
laziness and physical endurance have justified labor exploitation for centuries. Although 
stereotypes of laziness and physical endurance seem incompatible with one another, they both 
justify labor exploitation of indigenous peoples. Because the Guatemalan oligarchy has 
historically influenced the government, enforcing labor laws has not been a priority in Guatemala 
(Casaús 1995). The lack of political will to implement policies that benefit or protect indigenous 
peoples stems from a lack of representation of indigenous peoples in Guatemalan congress, 
unequal land distribution, low taxes on wealth, and underfunding education, healthcare, and law 
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enforcement (Pásara 2001). In short, indigenous peoples in Guatemala have historically suffered 
exclusion from the national economy, political participation, and access to resources for making 
a living. 
At the regional level, inequalities between Ladinos (people of the town) and indigenous 
peoples (people of the aldeas, or mountain hamlets) further explain how Ch’orti’ people suffer 
structural violence. First, people living in town have immediate access to more services, such as 
healthcare facilities, middle schools and high schools, better roads, stores, governmental offices, 
etc. Most aldeas have elementary schools, but not necessarily middle schools and much less high 
schools, and lack of good roads isolates them from the regional economy and inhibits political 
participation. Beyond spatial separation, much discrimination is directed against “Indian”–
looking campesinos, where Ladino attitudes towards Ch’orti’ people range from sympathy to 
paternalism to derision (Metz 2006). For instance, Ladinos disrespectfully ignore indigenous 
campesinos in the public sphere. What is more, some Ladinos do not want their children sharing 
schooling and health facilities with Ch’orti’ people, and others take advantage of Ch’orti’ people 
by overcharging them for services. In short, Ladinos nurture and take advantage of Ch’orti’ 
vulnerability, which ultimately leads to Ch’orti’ people suffering malnutrition, poorer health and 
healthcare, and shortened lives. 
Neoliberal decentralization was touted as one way for governments to better attend to 
local populations, but due to a regional culture of discrimination and corruption, locally elected 
officials have served themselves with the influx of money, not their neediest constituents. Before 
decentralization, the main source of municipal funding was selling or renting former indigenous 
community land that had been officially declared municipal land in 1871 (Dary, Elías and Reyna 
1998). Since decentralization, it is a cliché in local politics that candidates promise everything, 
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like roads, bridges, water systems, and schools, but do nothing once they are in office except 
embezzle the 11% of the national budget given directly to municipios (equivalent to small U.S. 
counties) (Metz 2006). Mayors are also notorious for taking credit for the results of non-
municipal development projects, such as those of the National Peace Fund (FONAPAZ), or just 
flat misappropriating external project funds for their election campaigns (Metz 2008). When 
locally elected officials use public or development resources for personal benefit, they perpetuate 
structural violence against Ch’orti’ people in the region. 
Another way national and regional discrimination directly affects Ch’orti’ people is 
through labor exploitation. In Guatemala, a variety of laws legitimized labor exploitation of 
indigenous peoples during colonial times and the period of Liberal Reforms (1871-1944). The 
last of the Liberal dictators,  General Jorge Ubico, established policies of forced labor for 
impoverished people, particularly indigenous people1 (Metz 2006). Although a new, protective 
Labor Code was passed in 1947 after a democratic revolution in Guatemala, lack of enforcement 
after the return of oligarchy in 1954 has been the norm. In turn, global competition in export-
oriented industries has driven wages further down since the 1990s. When I visited the Ch’orti’ 
area in 2011, I met a twelve-year old who had worked at a coffee plantation for two weeks and 
returned home with the equivalent of $30. Although $30 are much less than the salary a worker 
should legally receive in Guatemala for working in agriculture for two weeks, children earning 
$30 in two weeks greatly contribute to the household survival. As Scott (1976) found in 
Southeast Asia, when households must feed themselves from small plots in overpopulated 
                                               
1 La violencia, or las ruinas, began in the 1930s when dictator Jorge Ubico implemented policies that 
forced indigenous peoples to work without pay in dangerous road construction projects, and established a 
network of officials, military commissioners, and spies that penetrated communities (Metz, Mariano and 
López García 2010). 
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regions, they will work unimaginably hard and long for the smallest increments in production –
and for the lowest wages. Food scarcity is the handmaiden of exploitation and miserable 
employment conditions.  
National and regional exclusion explains why the Ch’orti’ population depends on poor 
lands for survival. Pressured by epidemics, natural disasters, and forced labor, communities have 
historically moved away to rugged mountain slopes poorly suited to the subsistence agriculture. 
In the mountains, the use of land has been so intensive that almost all the forests have been 
cleared for more subsistence agriculture, exposing the slopes directly to tropical downpours and 
erosion and diminishing key resources for the subsistence lifestyle, including herbs, fruit, greens, 
firewood, and construction materials (Dary, Elías and Reyna 1998). Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the population has grown at unprecedented rates and the mountains no longer 
provide enough land for big families to successfully continue to use historical survival strategies 
(Metz 2006). In short, subsistence agriculture does not guarantee a sustainable source of food for 
Ch’orti’ families due to environmental degradation and population growth. 
As a result of the self-perpetuating cycle of environmental degradation and population 
growth, Ch’orti’ people are periodically exposed to chronic food shortages that brutally impact 
the population’s culture and ethos (Metz 1995). Ch’orti’ people depend on subsistence 
agriculture in sometimes eroded and insufficient land, seasonal labor on coffee or sugar cane 
plantations, and selling utilitarian crafts, often to exploitative middlemen. In periodic years of 
low rainfall, or due to unforeseen events (such as droughts, earthquakes, plagues, economic 
crises, or prolonged dog days2), grain harvests fall and more seek plantation employment from 
                                               
2 La canícula is a dry period in July-August that divides the rainy seasons. 
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November to April. Throughout these periodic food shortages, some communities average 
enough land and food to feed themselves, but many do not (Dary et al. 1998; Metz 2006). Food 
shortages are locally conceptualized as Xiximay, spirit of feeling unsatiated (Metz 2006, 135; 
Girard 1949, 333; Wisdom 1961, 454), or Mal de Julio, the curse of July (Ramírez 2008).  
Figure 2: Cycle of Food Scarcity in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. 
 
Source: adapted from Vivero 2011. 
 
Anthropologists have found that the biggest threat to survival in populations suffering 
structural violence is premature death of preventable causes. In Alto do Cruzeiro in the 1960s 
and 1970s, infants and toddlers died from severe diarrhea and dehydration, conditions curable 
with a simple sugar, salt, and water solution (Scheper-Hughes 1987). Similarly, infectious 
diseases would wither bodies slowly despite known cures in Haiti in the early 2000s (Farmer 
2004). In the Ch’orti’ Maya area, preventable diseases often place children, the ill, and the 
elderly at the edge of survival during periodic periods of chronic food shortage. What is more, 
epidemics and natural disasters increase the number of deaths of preventable diseases, and as a 
result the Ch’orti’ population has suffered cycles of sudden decrease as well as increase due to 
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lack of family planning (Metz 2006). Premature death from preventable diseases is not a medical 
condition, but the symptom of structural violence. Indeed, temporarily treating individual cases 
of malnutrition does not guarantee long-term survival for populations suffering food scarcity. 
Structural violence also impacts communities’ identity and social fabric. Although 
Ch’orti’ people have been noted for their generosity and positive sense of territoriality and 
belonging, households also experience frustration, hopelessness, and indignity when they are 
facing periods of food shortage. Sometimes, tolerance for suffering emerges in the form of 
fatalistic narratives that explain food scarcity, such as the spirit of insatiability, Xiximay, who is 
known to invade food supplies (Wisdom 1940; Metz 2006:135). During mal de Julio, households 
running out of food reserves later than their neighbors are unable to help others, and as solidarity 
decreases delinquency often increases (Ramírez Juárez 2008). Indeed, envy among neighbors 
intensified in Ch’orti’ communities since dictator Jorge Ubico established networks of civilian 
espionage and persecuted of many forms of social organization, from religious to political groups 
and even cooperatives (Metz 2006). Historically, exposure to food scarcity has forced Ch’orti’ 
communities to sacrifice community integration.  
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN GUATEMALA: FROM THE COLD WAR TO 
A PARADOXICAL DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
 
The Jocotán Parish, which includes most of the territory in the Ch’orti’ Maya area, 
receives more development attention than the rest of eastern Guatemala because of its high 
indigenous population and extreme poverty. In 2009, government offices implemented 79 
projects in Jocotán, Camotán, San Juan Ermita and Olopa (SEGEPLAN 2009), and at least 30 
NGOs operated in the same municipalities in 2010 (Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo Camotán, 
SEGEPLAN 2010). In this section, I contextualize two waves of project proliferation in the 
Ch’orti’ Maya area by explaining the shift from government projects influenced by the Cold 
War, to multiple short projects influenced by a paradoxical democratic transition. Whereas 
political interests played a predominant role in shaping government development interventions in 
the 1940s-1980s, ever since neoliberal governments have been less involved and projects have 
been run by NGOs of various sizes and specializations with little long-term vision or 
coordination, projects have been leaving many people and problems to fall through gaps. 
Development Projects During the Cold War 
 
Prior to project proliferation, development interventions used to last a number of years 
and impacted large regions in recipient countries. In the context of the World War II 
reconstruction, the goal of the newborn global development industry was to incentivize national 
economic growth through large amounts of capital for investment in infrastructure, planning, and 
industrialization (Thorbecke 2000). Donor countries would allocate funding through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, and agencies like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) played a prominent role in shaping policy. Perhaps because of the volume of aid 
flows and the capacity of projects to transform national economies, political interests from both 
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donor and recipient countries came into play. In the Ch’orti’ Maya area, both the Cold War 
doctrine professed by the United States and the Guatemalan Civil War ideology shaped 
development interventions before project proliferation. As shown in Figure 3, the largest 
government-sponsored development interventions from the 1940s to the 1980s were politicized 
in Guatemala, and ideological and political changes resulted in the discontinuation of previous 
projects and the reformulation of new ones. 
Figure 3: Timeline of Government-sponsored Development Projects in the Ch’orti’ Region 
(1940s - 1980s) 
 
Democratically Elected Revolutionary Governments of Arévalo and Árbenz (1944-1954) 
Political aim: Support and modernize peasant production in order to assimilate indigenous peoples into 
Guatemalan nation. 
Projects implemented in the Ch’orti’ area: Provided improved maguey plants and cattle to Ch’orti’ 
people, built the first rural schools and health programs, promoted peasant leagues and unions, and 
implemented a contentious land redistribution program. 
 
The U.S.-Backed Military Coup (1954) provoked the discontinuation of 
revolutionary programs and policies. 
 
US-Funded Counterrevolutionary Strategy ‘Alliance for Progress’ (1960s - 1970s) 
Political aim: Foment international trade networks in order to prevent communism from spreading, and 
eradicate malaria. 
Projects implemented in the Ch’orti’ area: Established rural cooperatives and promoted economies of 
scale for enhanced market competition, together with family planning and green revolution fertilizers and 
pesticides. Nearly eradicated malaria. 
 
High Intensity period of the Armed Conflict (late 1970s) and Genocide 
(1981-1983) caused the persecution of cooperatives. 
 
Projects during the Transition to Peace Process (mid-1980s until 1996) 
Political aim: Regain support of the rural population after worst years of repression. 
Projects implemented in the Ch’orti’ area: DIGESA promoted agricultural self-development and 
sustainability, DIGESEPE aided in livestock care, BANDESA was the agricultural development bank, 
and DIGEBOS promoted the conservation of forests, soils, and water. 
 
Sources: (Metz, Mariano and López García 2010, Metz 2006, Dary, Elías and Reyna 1998). 
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Due to the Cold War and U.S. companies’ economic interests, the U.S. government used 
its power to affect funding allocation from WB and IMF to Guatemala from the 1940s to the 
1980s. During the Ten Years of Democracy3, the United Fruit Company found Guatemalan land 
redistribution program undesirable and lobbied U.S. politicians toward withholding loan 
assistance and technical cooperation from the country. Labeled as communist, the Guatemalan 
government did not receive loans from the World Bank between 1949 and 1954 (Krenn 1996). 
After the 1954 military coup, U.S.-funded projects promoting international trade networks 
provided an advantage for transnational corporations operating in Guatemala (Metz 2006, 61-63, 
240). Despite human rights violations, U.S. funding continued throughout the Guatemalan Civil 
War (1960-1996)4 and declined when it was clear that the guerrillas were largely defeated (Metz 
2006). In short, foreign political and economic interests shaped the largest government 
development interventions in Guatemala between the 1940s and the 1980s. Rather than aiming to 
eliminate food scarcity in the Ch’orti’ Maya area, these projects had more ideological, political, 
and economic aims. 
Despite the Guatemalan Civil War, religious missionaries have implemented 
development interventions in the Ch’orti’ Maya area since the 1960s. I suggest their proximity to 
Ch’orti’ communities and independent sources of funding made religious interventions more 
informed of the needs of the population than government development interventions of the time. 
For instance, two generations of Quakers moved to the region and offered technological and 
financial development to particular communities (Metz 2006). Although projects heavily relied 
                                               
3 The decade of 1944-1954 is an interlude between the Jorge Ubico thirty-year dictatorship and the 
Guatemalan Civil War, in which much of the population became electorally enfranchised. 
4 During the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996), citizen surveillance and state repression re-emerged in 
response to guerrilla groups. Maya communities (83% of the two million victims of violence) suffered 
geographical displacement and were the systematic target of rape, torture, and mass killings. 
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on missionaries’ physical presence, such that they were partially abandoned when missionaries 
left, one can find many remnants of the projects today. At a larger scale, the Catholic Belgian 
Mission has promoted hundreds of development interventions in the Ch’orti’ Maya area, 
including founding the Hospital Betania and Dispensary in Jocotán, the Fe y Alegría boarding 
school, the Ch’orti’ radio, irrigation systems, and roads (Metz 2006). Because of its long-term 
presence in the region, the Belgian Mission has remarkably taken more responsibility for the 
welfare of the local population than the state, offering education, healthcare, communications, 
finance, and infrastructure services in the local sphere. Although the Catholic Action Network 
certainly responded to larger political events5, the Belgian Mission’s funding depended on a 
religious network supporting missionaries rather than on foreign politics or the economic 
interests of private corporations. For that reason, missionaries were able to live in the region and 
become familiar with the needs of the population while implementing development 
interventions. 
Although government interventions had the possibility of fostering indigenous peoples’ 
integration to national politics and international economies from the 1940s to the 1980s, none of 
these efforts worked. First, democratic governments of the 1940s were trying to assimilate 
indigenous peoples into a national culture, but this was cut short by the counter-revolution in 
1954. Afterwards, the U.S. Alliance for Progress considered cooperatives effective vehicles for 
incorporating indigenous peoples into international markets, but these were repressed locally for 
competing with Ladino interests and nationally and internationally for being “subversive.” 
Finally, the state partially encouraged democratic citizenship by fostering the participation of 
                                               
5 The Catholic Action Network originally formed as a missionary effort to prevent perceived communist 
atheism from spreading to indigenous communities. Nevertheless, missionaries witnessing the repression 
and exploitation of their poor congregants acquired more humanistic and openly progressive stances.  
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community leaders in development after the worst years of the Armed Conflict. Nevertheless, the 
fear of Ladino reprisal (Metz, Mariano and López García 2010), military repression of 
communal organization (Casolo 2011, 87), and communities’ suspicion, refuge and distrust 
(Metz 2006) prevented Ch’orti’ people from fully participating in national politics and 
international economies. Despite the Belgian Mission’s efforts to promote political awakening 
and fellowship in the region, indigenous peoples were still excluded from national politics and 
international markets by the time the global development industry turned its attention to poverty 
reduction.  
The transition from national economic growth to globally integrated poverty reduction 
since the 1970s involved a shift in both the objectives and the means of development practice. 
Instead of trying to impact national economies, new programs directly targeted poor populations 
through technical co-operation, policy-conditioned program aid, support for the private sector 
and for NGOs, and emergency assistance (Mosley and Marion 2000). In the 1970s, agencies 
started incorporating empowerment and participatory methodologies, as well as gender 
awareness. As the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
progressively incorporated more types of Official Development Assistance [ODA], multilateral 
and bilateral funding started decreasing. Agencies began hiring more outside contractors and 
consultants, and local and regional NGOs were contracted to implement projects because they 
were considered flexible and close to the communities (Nolan 2001, McMichael 2000). In short, 
the 1970s saw the beginning of a re-arrangement of the institutions and procedures that made 
development interventions possible.  
The result of the policy transition from national economic growth to globally integrated 
poverty reduction was a market-oriented allocation of resources within the global development 
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industry. As multilateral and bilateral funding started decreasing and new actors (consultants and 
NGOs) joined the development industry, funding allocation started occurring through 
competitive bidding processes. First, donors establish a set of filters that determine how 
development funding is allocated globally. For instance, the World Bank establishes income 
group thresholds and the OECD prioritizes ‘aid orphan’ countries. Although donors allocate 
funding to areas of the greatest need or topics they consider important (human rights, peace, 
democracy, transparency, or economic stability), they also allocate funding based on their 
political interests or speculation. For instance, many donors decided to divert funding to Africa 
to compete with attention from China in the mid 2000s. Beyond determining which development 
agency will implement which project, the market-oriented allocation of development resources 
fosters the emergence of service economies in particular beneficiary regions of the world when 
funding is abundant. In turn, they foster competition when funding decreases, as regional and 
local development agencies compete in bidding and grant-writing for project funds allocated by 
donors great and small. 
In the Ch’orti’ Maya area, the arrival of World Vision in 1970 was a direct product of the 
re-arrangement of the global development industry in market-oriented terms. As opposed to 
previous projects funded through government-to-government bilateral transferences or religious 
networks, World Vision incorporated a mechanism for sponsoring children in cycles of three 
years. In a nutshell, the mechanism consists on establishing an international network of offices 
dedicated to fundraising, administration, and aid delivery. Donors get to choose a child in need 
of sponsorship and commit to donate a monthly amount. Then, the local aid delivery office is in 
charge of facilitating communication between the sponsor and the child, as well as providing a 
set of gifts for the child and their family –such as clothes, school supplies, and sometimes food. 
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Although many humanitarian organizations have expanded by adopting such model, World 
Vision was by far the earliest to arrive to the Ch’orti’ Maya. Arguably, the worst years of the 
Guatemalan Civil War kept humanitarian institutions from reaching all regions of the country, 
and instead fostered the arrival of human rights commissions interested in documenting the 
atrocities committed by both the Guatemalan army and guerrilla groups during the 1980s. The 
Ch’orti’ Maya area experienced a wave of non-governmental development projects (with 
funding allocated in market-oriented terms) during the peace process in the 1990s, which 
redoubled after a regional famine in 2001. 
Neoliberal Economics, Peace Politics, and Project Proliferation 
 
…capital tended to flow directly from private and multilateral funding agencies to 
specific local constituencies or projects. Economically, these direct flows were 
seen as being more cost-effective, efficient and flexible. Politically, this method 
dovetailed with second-wave of democratization efforts that sought to strengthen 
civil society and cultivate transparency (DeHart 2009). 
 
In the 1990s, the end of the Armed Conflict fostered a complex transition to democracy 
in Guatemala. While governments started adopting neoliberal economic policies, which 
gradually weakened the state, the peace process fostered the possibility of promoting a 
democratically active citizenship. After years of economically crippling warfare and debt, 
governments of the early 1990s began to follow U.S. and IMF recipes for market liberalization 
by opening Guatemalan borders to international trade, privatizing national industries, 
decentralizing government institutions, and cutting government spending.6 In the meantime, the 
                                               
6 The global development industry as a whole promoted neoliberal policies. Through the 1980s, donor 
countries redirected development funding to salvage the shaky international financial system caused by 
the oil crisis and consequent institutional debt crisis (Thorbecke 2000). Structural adjustment programs 
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government and the organization representing all of the guerrilla factions –Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (URNG)– negotiated and signed a number of agreements 
to protect citizens’ human rights, resettle displaced communities, clarify historical events, 
recognize indigenous rights, and set socioeconomic and agrarian policies. Throughout the 
negotiations, relationships between human rights defenders and grass-roots communities 
proliferated and intensified, unleashing a flood of international development activity in the 
countryside (DeHart 2009). Upon the completion of the Peace Accords, almost $2 billion in 
additional foreign aid, mostly by governments, was channeled to Guatemala for reconstruction.  
Although the initial purpose of funding for development was to rebuild the country and 
strengthen the new democracy, the NGO sector proliferated with no practical oversight or 
coordination (Rohloff, Kraemer Díaz and Dasgupta 2011). Indeed, as donors began to allocate 
funding through market-oriented mechanisms, development projects diverged from their initial 
commitment to strengthen democracy. 
In the 1990s, the Ch’orti’ area saw a retraction of government sponsored development 
programs, the rise of indigenous-focused projects, emergency aid for a cholera epidemic, a 
hurricane, and famine, and a large-scale UN-coordinated project meant to supplement 
subsistence agriculture with market-oriented peasant production. The last project, PROZACHI, 
funded by the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), spent nearly $2 
million in several municipios from 1991-2002 and on agriculture technology, infrastructure, 
training, and loans to incentivize market competition. While the credit and workshops were 
                                                                                                                                                       
consisted of bilateral and multilateral loans promoting market liberalization through attached 
conditionality (Nolan 2002). Structural adjustment programs transformed the terms of global economic 
integration, as recipient countries were forced to compete in international markets but with clear 
disadvantages. The poor in recipient countries were the most affected (Nash 2006). 
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much appreciated, the project relied on inadequate financial assessments and ultimately resulted 
in uneven and unpayable debt in many communities (Casolo 2011). In the meantime, a 
conglomeration of agencies emerging from the Peace Accords attended to issues of ethnic and 
gender discrimination, political participation, education, and land tenure. The Coordinadora 
Maya Ch’orti’ (COMACH), part of a larger Mayanist network funded largely by European 
government donors as well as transnational NGOs, promoted political participation and positive 
identity. The Catholic Church, which played a critical role in the Peace Accords, also devoted 
itself to human rights in the decade. However, neither PROZACHI nor the human rights groups 
reversed the structural inequalities behind food scarcity, although some families managed to 
improve their standing significantly by using the aid to their tactical advantage (Metz 2007).  
While emergent development agencies simultaneously promoted market competition and 
political participation of indigenous peoples, two local emergencies in the 1990s fostered the 
arrival of humanitarian assistance for the first time in the Ch’orti’ region since the 1976 
earthquake. During the 1992 cholera epidemic, Red Cross International coordinated the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance, but distrust between Ch’orti’ people and Ladinos did not allow an 
effective distribution of aid (Metz 2006). Later, during the 1998 Hurricane Mitch, Elías Gramajo 
(1999) observed a cycle of dependency and paternalism in the process of delivering humanitarian 
aid. In the aftermath of catastrophes, some agencies started implementing development projects 
that were often discontinued before they could sustain any long-term results. For instance, 
Catholic Relief Services and USAID funded a four-year project based on reconciliation and 
justice after Hurricane Mitch. A local development practitioner stated: 
The diocese promoted processes of collective emotional recovery. We were many 
employees, maybe 60 or 70 people. We worked on land tenure, especially where we 
knew community conflicts had occurred. One by one, projects ended. Each project lasted 
2 or 3 years. (…) We attended communities in Zacapa, Teculután, Gualán, Camotán, 
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Olopa, La Unión, and Huité. After USAID stopped funding this program, I saw them 
again in 2008, but they were promoting local economic development with the 
Mancomunidad Copán Ch’orti. 
 
After the country-wide project proliferation of the 1990s, funding started decreasing in 
Guatemala due to a strong and lingering ‘aid fatigue’ (see Thorbecke 2000). In 1992, precisely at 
the end of the Cold War, funding for development started decreasing worldwide for the first time 
in history, and deciding where to allocate limited resources became even more contentious 
(Hjertholm and White 2000). Categorized as a middle-income developing country since 1989, 
Guatemala remained a priority for donor agendas for as long as the peace process lasted. When a 
national referendum aiming to follow up the peace process was rejected due to elite interference 
in 1999, international funding for development dried up. In the context of decreasing funding and 
an incomplete peace process, donor nations and development agencies rethought their initial 
broad commitment to strengthen democracy and rebuild the country. Depending on sources of 
funding, local and regional Guatemalan NGOs continued to survive by tending to particular 
issues of interest for the global development industry. Currently, they address a broad range of 
agendas ranging from healthcare (Rohloff, Kraemer Díaz and Dasgupta 2011) to rural 
sustainable development (DeHart 2009) and ecotourism (Dickins 2007). 
The second wave of project proliferation in the Ch’orti’ Maya area occurred despite 
decreasing funding for the country, through a political process of calling national and 
international attention to food scarcity in the region. In 2001, the mayor of Jocotán did not have 
the support of the political party of the country’s president because he belonged to a different 
political party. Without national funding, the mayor decided to attract media attention to the 
needs of the Ch’orti’ region. The Xiximay, or Mal de Julio, had been particularly harsh that year 
due to decreasing coffee prices the year before, and the media portrayed the 2001famine as a 
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one-time emergency starting in August, thereby hiding the structural dynamics of food scarcity 
in the region (see López 2009). The result was a burst of national and international funding for 
humanitarian aid and development, but without a delivery strategy. 
Local development practitioners report confusion, disorganization, and even the selling of 
humanitarian food by beneficiaries. Although some initiatives were potentially capable of 
challenging food scarcity after the famine in 2001, the government did not invest enough in 
keeping them working. For instance, the Ministry of Health investigated a set of indicators that 
predicted malnutrition at an early stage and designed an intervention capable of providing early 
emergency healthcare before kids went through episodes of severe diarrhea and dehydration. 
Nevertheless, the process was discontinued soon due to lack of funding when public attention 
shifted elsewhere. Although many initiatives of the time were discontinued due to lack of 
funding, new development agencies emerged. In 2001, four local municipalities (Jocotán, 
Camotán, San Juan Ermita, and Olopa) established the Mancomunidad Copán Ch’orti’ to attract 
funding for development in the Jocotán Parish. They acquired a model suggested by Spanish 
donors, and wrote a 30-year development plan. The Municipal Code regulated the functions of 
Mancomunidad Copán Ch’orti’ in 2003, and it has since attracted millions of dollars for 
development throughout the years. Some development agencies in the Ch’orti’ Maya area say the 
Mancomunidad monopolizes most donors, and there have been rumors of corruption among the 
Mancomunidad, the mayors, and construction contractors. 
If the first wave of project proliferation fostered the emergence of multiple development 
agencies, the 2001 famine provoked bureaucratic changes in already existent agencies through 
the arrival of new funding from outsiders. For instance, although PROZACHI funding was over 
in 2002, donors and practitioners encouraged the formation of ASORECH, an association of 
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people who had collaborated with PROZACHI. COMACH also suffered institutional instability 
because of a lack of accountability and declining international funding for indigenous causes in 
Guatemala (Metz 2007). Since then, funding cycles of booms and busts have produced abundant 
and simultaneous projects, which are shorter and narrower in scope, with impacts that last little 
past the end of projects. As I will explain in the following chapters, coordination toward 
challenging food scarcity has been almost impossible. 
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ANALYZING OBSTACLES IN DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE 
 
Project proliferation in the Ch’orti’ Maya area was the result of a re-arrangement of the 
global development industry, where donors began to allocate funding in market-oriented terms, 
and a complex transition to democracy in Guatemala, where development projects gradually 
diverged from their initial commitment to strengthen democracy. What obstacles prevent 
development projects from changing the structural causes of food scarcity in the Ch’orti’ Maya 
area after project proliferation? In this chapter, I describe the theoretical framework 
ethnographies of aid offer for analyzing the development interventions, and my methodology. 
Ethnographies of Development 
 
Anthropological approaches to development have historically responded to changes in the 
global development industry. In the 1970s, when international agencies turned their attention to 
poverty reduction, practitioner anthropologists and sociologists analyzed their personal 
experiences of working for development agencies and proposed a variety of lessons for practice, 
including participatory, empowering, and gender-informed approaches and methodologies 
(Cernea 1985, Chambers 2008). Although their contributions helped re-shape implementation 
processes, their suggestions did not ameliorate the political and economic interests involved in 
development practice. When the uneven consequences of structural adjustment programs 
exploded in the 1990s, anthropologists became interested in studying the geopolitical interests of 
development by critically deconstructing its historical claims (Escobar 1994) and describing the 
role of projects in expanding bureaucratic state power (Ferguson 1994). Although such 
contributions turned anthropological attention to development’s political and economic interests, 
their conceptualization of development as a machine of all-encompassing calculated geopolitics 
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did not represent the diversity of situations that occur in development practice. 
In the aftermath of such oft-decontextualized anthropological approaches to development, 
scholars tend to polarize the practical / instrumental approach (development anthropology), with 
its moral commitment to become involved with development practice, and the critical 
deconstructionist perspective (anthropology of development) (Gow 2002). Indeed, 
anthropologists seemingly expect one another to take a position ‘for or against development’ by 
explaining developments’ deleterious side effects as either misinformed mistakes or the result of 
calculated geopolitics and economic self-interest. In contrast, a new generation of development 
anthropologists propose to abandon the dichotomy of engagement / armchair critique by 
investigating development programs and projects as socially constructed, transcultural processes. 
David Mosse (2004), one of the proponents of ethnographies of development, mentions: 
I am not concerned here with ‘best practice’ or lessons for replication. (…) I am not 
interested, as some critical analysts are, with passing judgment on development. My 
concern is not whether, but how development works. The approach is ethnographic.  
 
Beyond doing fieldwork in NGO settings, ethnographies of development offer a 
theoretical framework from which to analyze the development industry in the context of 
globalization. On the one hand, doing ethnography of development involves recognizing that the 
global development industry has become multi-sited. Thus, anthropologists attend to 
development processes as overlapping arenas of social networks and discourses with actors of 
varying interests and tools at their disposal (De Sardan 2005). Ethnographers of development 
also recognize that development is not only a process of adding new discourses and resources, 
but often subtracting: 
We tend to evaluate development in terms of outcomes and gains (e.g., incomes, goods 
and services), but it is also important to evaluate it in terms of what people give up or 
lose (and why they resist) in experiencing development in these terms (McMichael 2000). 
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My thesis analyzes the obstacles to changing the structural causes of food scarcity in the 
Ch’orti’ Maya areas. As mentioned earlier, the experiences and perspectives of local 
development practitioners I interviewed highlight two obstacles in particular: (1) funding 
fluctuation inhibits long-term planning and collaboration among local agencies, and (2) donors 
and local politicians ensure a portion of development funding benefits them before practitioners 
get to implement projects. First, development projects in the Ch’orti’ Maya area have become 
attempts to create ‘easy ways out of poverty’. Although decades of experience have taught local 
development practitioners that challenging food scarcity requires holistic, long-term 
interventions, funding fluctuation does not allow projects to seek structural changes. Thus, 
projects have treated the symptoms but not the causes of food scarcity. Second, while 
development practitioners are required to account for every penny they spend, they have 
observed cases of politicians and donors making sure a portion of development resources 
benefits them before the money is spent in projects. Practitioners call this practice ‘slicing a 
piece of cake for themselves’. Given that the interests of local politicians and industries 
connected with donors prevail over beneficiary population’s needs, corruption and expenses 
requirements have in the past prevented projects from challenging structural causes of food 
scarcity. 
My analysis challenges the assumption that a market-oriented allocation of resources 
offers promising avenues for reducing poverty. I illustrate a variety of reasons why projects, 
instead of producing long-term results, become vulnerable to political interests in the Ch’orti’ 
Maya. Projects do not produce sustainable effects, and the benefits of development interventions 
and humanitarian aid do not arrive to all households that need them. Why have development 




The objective of my methodology was to collect and analyze the experiences and 
perspectives of local development practitioners in the Ch’orti’ Maya area regarding the obstacles 
projects encounter for challenging structural causes of food scarcity. In the summer of 2015, I 
spent eight weeks doing ethnographic fieldwork throughout the Ch’orti’ Maya area. There are 
four predominantly Ch’orti’ municipalities the size of a small U.S. county in the department of 
Chiquimula: Jocotán, Camotán, San Juan Ermita, and Olopa. While all the development 
practitioners I interviewed implemented projects targeting communities in these municipalities, 
their homes and offices were more often located in larger urban towns. Thus, I spent most of the 
time in Chiquimula and frequently traveled to development offices located in Jocotán, 
Quetzaltepeque, and Esquipulas. My fieldwork was funded by a Tinker travel award from the 
KU Center of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. 
I interviewed a total of 17 people. Ten of them were local development practitioners who 
provided narratives of typical obstacles projects encounter for challenging food scarcity, and 
seven were local experts who provided knowledge about public institutions, alternative jobs, 
political issues and local history. Since both development practitioners and local experts belong 
to the local network of development practitioners, I used a snowball sampling technique to 
contact and interview all study participants. I began by contacting three local NGO workers my 
advisor recommended, and continued contacting more participants throughout the 8 weeks of my 
fieldwork. Although the sample is not representative or generalizable, it is illustrative of the 
kinds of obstacles development projects encounter in the Ch’orti’ Maya area for challenging 
food scarcity.  
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Figure 4: Location of the Ch’orti’ Maya Area of Eastern Guatemala 
 
Source: Map by Amy Henderson, published in Metz 1998 (328). 
 
The sample of local development practitioners who provided narratives of typical 
obstacles in development practice was fairly homogeneous. Most were men in their 40’s and 
50’s who had worked for at least two development agencies funded by international agencies in 
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the Ch’orti’ area. Six of them had been trained as agricultural engineers at the University of San 
Carlos (CUNORI), Chiquimula campus, and several held a diversity of senior and lower 
positions within agencies, ranging from technicians to directors and even board members of 
NGOs (see Table 1). In turn, the sample of local experts was very heterogeneous, as each person 
provided a particularly important outside perspective on what development meant for their field 
of expertise (see Table 2). The following charts summarize the study sample. In order to protect 
participants’ identities, I will keep their comments anonymous. 
 
Table 1: Interviewees Providing Typical Experiences of Development Practice 
 Interviewee Position Agency / Institution Location 
1 NGO Director ASOVERDE (Green Development Association) Chiquimula 
2 Project Director ProCh'orti' (Ch’orti’ Project) Jocotán 
3 Technician Save the Children Chiquimula 
4 NGO Director ASORECH Quetzaltepeque 
5 Technician Acción Contra el Hambre (Action Against Hunger) Chiquimula 
6 Technical Manager Plan Trifinio Esquipulas 
7 General Manager Mancomunidad Copán Ch'orti' Jocotán 
8 Technician Save the Children Chiquimula 
9 Technician World Vision Jocotán 
10 Program Manager Oxfam Guatemala City 
 
 
Table 2: Interviewees Providing Local Expert Knowledge 
 Interviewee Position / Institution Area of Expertise 
1 Catholic Priest (Belgian Mission) Local history of development 
2 Faculty Member at CUNORI Agriculture Program at CUNORI 
3 National Institute of Forests [INAB] Forest conservation programs 
4 General Secretary of Planning [SEGEPLAN] Government Decentralization 
5 Hotel Ramírez owner Politics and local networks 
6 Ch’orti’ Maya Technical High School in Natural Resources Education and local job market 
7 Entrepreneur, former development worker Local economy and politics 
 
 
I discovered some of the inner workings of the local development network in the process 
of contacting and interviewing people. First, I found that internal hierarchies are recognized by 
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the position practitioners hold (e.g., technician vs. director), and where their offices are located 
(higher status in Chiquimula, much higher status in Guatemala City). Second, I found that 
partnerships among local development workers have fostered the sharing of ideas and practices 
related to project implementation in times of funding availability, but gossip and competition 
when funding has decreased. Finally, practitioners’ connection with CUNORI reveals that most 
local development workers have similar job qualifications, which diminishes the potential for 
incorporating multidisciplinary approaches but enhances the potential for incorporating 
university students and doing research in collaboration with the university. 
I learned the most about the obstacles for addressing food scarcity through the 17 
interviews I conducted. For each interview, I explained my research topic and broadly asked 
about their experience while working on development interventions in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. 
Participants and I discussed the origins and proliferation of development interventions, the 
problems that arise with funding fluctuation and changing ‘hot topics’ of the development 
industry, the challenging interactions between projects, donors, and local governments, and the 
difficulties of navigating the job market. I used thematic analysis for the interviews, carefully 
listening to all of them and paying particular attention to the obstacles for project implementation 
mentioned. I transcribed key quotes and grouped them in two categories: (1) ‘looking for easy 
ways out of poverty’, when funding fluctuation fosters competing short-term projects unable to 
produce structural changes, and (2) ‘slicing development resources like a cake,’ when 
availability of funding has been contingent on whether politicians or donors themselves benefit 
from the interventions. 
Beyond my internship with Nuevo Día (New Day) in 2011 and interviewing study 
participants in the summer of 2015, my interactions with local development practitioners 
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involved participating in a workshop with the NGO ASOVERDE (Green Development 
Association), participating in a community meeting with the NGO ProCh’orti’ (Project Ch’orti’), 
and participating in a number of meetings with Engineers Without Borders, ASORECH (Ch’orti’ 
Peasant Regional Association), and local community recipients of a rural water project and an 
ecotourism project. Throughout such experiences, my own identity and the identity of 
development practitioners who participated in the study colored our interactions. Indeed, 
ethnographers are never just ‘observers’; like it or not, we are committed actors socially 
interconnected with people who experience the dynamics we are trying to understand. I was 
younger than the local development workers I interviewed, and the fact that I am studying the 
Masters degree at a foreign university placed me in a position of privilege compared to the types 
of jobs to which they have access. A few pointed out they never had the opportunity to study 
abroad, and their lack of opportunities resulted in the types of jobs they have today. The men, 
therefore, enjoyed being the professional authorities and conveyers of knowledge to a young, 
privileged woman. Overall, they happily contributed to this study and were interested (and very 
curious) to learn about what I had learned in previous interviews.   
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ADAPTING TO THE RHYTHMS OF FUNDING FLUCTUATION 
 
In this chapter, I describe how funding fluctuation fosters competing short-term projects 
unable to produce structural changes. When development practitioners find themselves adapting 
to the rhythms of funding fluctuation’, they can only feign to implement ‘easy ways out of 
poverty’. As mentioned earlier, the examples I present here are not generalizable nor 
representative of what ‘always’ happens with development practice in the region. Rather, these 
examples illustrate the kinds of obstacles that have arisen to a greater or lesser extent in the past. 
Looking for Easy Ways Out 
 
When there was money, much more money than there is today, they did not think 
of a more reasonable strategy. They were looking for the easy way out – 
Development Practitioner 
 
When the 2001 famine got media attention and development practitioners started arriving 
to the Ch’orti’ Maya area to deliver humanitarian aid, they engaged in multiple discussions over 
the causes of food shortage. Assuming the famine was a one-time event, development 
practitioners were eager to find a simple explanation for it. They first thought food scarcity was 
the result of an unusual draught, but they dismissed the hypothesis when they realized rain 
patterns in 2001 were similar to other years. When they discovered a correlation between low 
coffee prices and cases of acute malnutrition, they resolved to break the dependence upon low 
skilled labor by facilitating local production for the market and subsistence. My informants 
remember projects involving iguanas, rabbits, quails, chickens, goats, sheep, and fish; but there 
have also been initiatives promoting soap, jocote fruit (tropical plum), baskets, tomatoes, onions, 
pineapples, and small mats for decorating commercial rum bottles. In the words of one 
interviewee, the region became a ‘laboratory of things that do not work,’ where projects have 
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temporarily benefitted individual families to a greater or lesser extent, but without challenging 
structural violence. 
Looking for the easy way out in development means trying to find a solution that fixes all 
the problems of the region, but without fully understanding the complex structural causes of food 
scarcity. For instance, although reliance on low skilled labor in coffee plantations is an important 
component of structural violence in the Ch’orti’ region, promoting alternative sources of money 
does not guarantee a sustainable source of food because other structural dynamics, such as 
population growth, and environmental factors, will continue to cause food shortages. What is 
more, many experiments required resources such as land or fodder that Ch’orti’ people simply do 
not have. There is no easy way out of self-perpetuating cycles of food scarcity. I argue that 
development practitioners have looked for easy ways out of poverty because the resources at 
their disposal directly depend upon funding fluctuation. As donors multiplied, they were more 
specific in their expectations and required more concrete, short-term, measurable results, causing 
development practitioners to prioritize institutional needs over beneficiaries’ needs. Meanwhile, 
funding decline has also sparked competition, rather than collaboration, between agencies. 
Before doing fieldwork, I expected to find agencies with a large staff simultaneously 
implementing a diversity of short-term projects in a variety of communities of the Ch’orti’ 
region. Instead, I found that most agencies were implementing one, or at the most two projects, 
and were in the process of applying for more funding. Some agencies I visited were desperate for 
funding, unable to offer the number of jobs they had offered in the past and afraid of losing their 
infrastructure and staff due to lack of funding. Under such circumstances, institutional survival 
was a priority for many. According to one NGO director, agencies need and demand funding in 
order to continue to work, and only when they have covered such need can they engage in 
33 
assessing and attending beneficiaries’ needs. Because institutional needs come first and 
development practitioners need to ensure future funding, they write proposals for projects that 
follow ‘hot topics’ of the global development industry, sometimes paying little attention to 
beneficiary needs. One development practitioner I talked to mentioned that in order to attract 
more funding, agencies “dance to the rhythm of international cooperation.” He said: 
Agencies may talk about garbage and solid waste today, and they work on cleaning the 
city, but when funding is over, the initiative is discontinued. Then, they decide to talk 
about gender and they establish the office of the woman, but if international cooperation 
stops financing the office of the woman, they close it as if nothing happened. 
Environmental offices, forest offices, and what have you (NGO Director). 
 
That the development industry continuously changes the vocabulary used to talk about 
development projects does not always mean that it is innovative in the types of strategies it 
promotes. Sometimes, it is quite the opposite. One NGO director recounted: 
Twenty years later, some agencies keep doing the same things [that do not work]. 
Projects consist of delivering sinks, latrines, chickens, fertilizer… and now with “a focus 
on climate change”, “intelligent agriculture”, and what have you. But the discourse of 
climate smartness does not hold when you go to the communities and see what they are 
[really] doing: they gave three fruit trees to each household. What is the climate 
smartness of planting fruit trees? They are making the same mistake. 
 
The incorporation of new approaches does not guarantee strategic innovation of strategies 
in the Ch’orti’ Maya area because of a disconnect between policy and practice. Indeed, many 
practitioners mentioned that agencies continue to replicate projects that have not worked in the 
past. My informants seemed particularly bothered by what I will call the ‘chicken project.’ 
Criticized by six of my interviewees, the ‘chicken project’ consists of providing supplies for 
households to produce eggs they can either sell or consume. One practitioner working for a 
governmental office mentioned: 
We deliver 12 chickens and 1 rooster [to 1 household], but the chicken project is only 
profitable if you own 500 chickens. What is a woman with 12 eggs doing in town [at the 
market]? She spent Q5 to get there, Q5 to go back, and she is going to sell her eggs for a 
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total of Q12. Why did we give her 12 chickens? So she remains poor. So she eats the 
eggs. 
Overall, my informants think the ‘chicken project’ is too expensive for the benefits it 
provides. A few pitfalls of the ‘chicken project’ they mentioned include the lack of a guaranteed 
market, competition against economies of scale in the poultry industry, the high costs of 
supplies, and the fact that beneficiaries depend on agencies to get supplies (which is 
unsustainable). What is more, the benefits of the ‘chicken project’ last little past its 
implementation because families end up eating the chickens when they no longer produce 
enough eggs. None of the development practitioners knew exactly how often agencies actually 
replicate the ‘chicken project’, but the amount of criticism it received says something about the 
lack of mechanisms to prevent agencies from ‘recycling’ development recipes that have not 
worked in the past. Although development practitioners have certainly learned from previous 
mistakes, many are willing to continue to implement projects that have not worked in the past, 
arguably, as a strategy to meet institutional needs and feed their own families. 
While agencies sometimes replicate old recipes that do not work, innovative projects are 
often discontinued before they can trigger any long-term results due to lack of funding. For 
instance, one agency implemented a project aiming to restore forest systems by paying 
beneficiaries for maintaining good practices of conservation on their own land. Although the 
project was a sustainable alternative for impacting environmental deterioration while providing a 
source of economic access to food, it only lasted eight months. According to the development 
practitioner I talked to, the project would have had to continue for at least five years in order to 
start impacting land deterioration. In this case, as in others, donors’ insistence on measurable and 
short-term results undermined the possibility of challenging structural causes of food scarcity. 
While pre- and post-project analyses are standardly written, it is well known in the development 
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industry that they are often ignored, including by donors (Olivier de Sardan 2005; Chambers 
2008).  With little institutional memory and inadequate funding and time, the means to gauge the 
sustainable potential of new initiatives are weakened. Whether they work or not, most projects 
are discontinued when funding is over. 
In a context where projects last only a few months and donors demand immediate results, 
local development agencies funnel scare benefits to those with the greatest chances of success. 
That is, they sometimes choose particular beneficiaries who have in the past taken more 
advantage of projects than others. A local development worker told me the story of a woman 
who has received ‘at least something from everybody in the past ten years’: a greenhouse 
intended for 5 or 10 families, a new greenhouse a few years later by another agency, yet a third 
greenhouse from a third agency, a water system, and more infrastructure. Although admittedly 
the woman is very persistent and puts a lot of effort in maintaining the benefits of development 
interventions, my informant criticized agencies’ construal of her as a success. Another 
development worker mentioned that cases of success should not be generalized as solutions for 
everybody. 
If Miss Juana lives in this community and we gave her 20 chickens, and she came to our 
workshops, and it turns out she now has 40 chickens and she is selling eggs… then 
agencies think they need a project of 2000 beneficiaries like her. But they will not find 
them. There is a limited number of women like Miss Juana [who would take advantage of 
the project so effectively] in the Ch’orti’ region, and we should not turn everybody into 
poultry farmers, just as we cannot turn everybody into bee-keepers, and we cannot turn 
everybody into coffee growers. Unfortunately, that is the aim of many projects [to have 
everybody produce the same things]. If the current hot topic is agroforestal systems with 
coffee, all agencies promote that. And I have seen coffee planted at 700 meters over sea 
level. Why would anybody grow coffee there? (…) They invest a lot of money, but only 
three to five good experiences remain. 
 
Agencies also ‘sell’ images of indigeneity as a strategy to ensure funding. As donor 
money began to be directed towards eastern Guatemala, projects started focusing in four 
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municipalities – Jocotán, Camotán, San Juan Ermita, and Olopa. Although these are the four 
poorest and most indigenous of the region, the area does not neatly coincide with Ch’orti’ or 
destitute peasants’ geographic limits. Partly because of the multiculturalism trend in the 1990s, 
and partly because of the media explosion of 2001, the word Ch’orti’ became popular and 
development agencies started using it to legitimize their projects to donors. If during the Peace 
Accords calling the area Ch’orti’ was a statement of self-determination, today agencies use it yet 
as another word to attract funding. One of my interviewees stated:  
The famous Ch’orti’ region is unique in that it has been restricted to four municipalities. 
For instance, if you are doing research in the Ch’orti’ region, I would suggest you 
compare the conditions or situations you will measure within the four municipalities 
[Jocotán, Camotán, San Juan Ermita and Olopa], which for political reasons people 
recognize as the Ch’orti’ region, and other municipalities with Ch’orti’ inhabitants. That 
is, go visit Quetzaltepeque, La Unión Zacapa, the highest part of Chiquimula, San 
Jacinto, Esquipulas, the highest part of Zacapa. And you will find huge differences [in 
how little exposure to development projects there is in Ch’orti’ communities that are not 
located in the Jocotán Parish]. Many people say they do not want to work in the Ch’orti’ 
region [in the Jocotán Parish] because there is no room for another agency. The so-called 
Ch’orti’ region is saturated. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of my thesis, I also had the impression that the Ch’orti’ 
region was saturated with development agencies when I first visited in December 2011. When 
visiting Ch’orti’ communities, it is easy to find multiple projects aiming to impact the same 
situations. Such abundance and multiplicity of development interventions fosters competition at 
all levels, and prevents agencies from coordinating efforts. 
Competing for Funding and Beneficiaries 
 
Just like institutional needs, competition creates incentives for development practitioners 
not to take care of beneficiaries’ needs. The earliest case of competition I heard was during the 
wave of project proliferation in the early 1990s. One of my informants remembers that, since the 
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beginning of the project, people in charge of administering funding wanted to deliver positive 
results before other projects did so in Western Guatemala, and they would constantly pressure 
technicians to deliver rapid results. Although development practitioners continuously found 
challenges they wanted to address before providing more loans (such as lack of education, the 
need for beneficiaries to clearly understand the terms of credits, etc.), they were pressured 
toward rapidly advancing with project results: 
[Employees were told that] if they did not distribute loans, the money would go to Africa. 
And so they started providing credits and credits, and some loans were not viable, and 
some people [beneficiaries] did not even know how to use the money because 
landowners used to pay them with sugar, oil, and coffee back then. 
 
Since 2000, competition has been related to the overabundance of development agencies 
and not so much to rush implementation to deliver the first results. Intentionally or not, agencies 
often implement the same initiatives in the same locations, without communicating with one 
another to coordinate efforts. As a result, some communities get a lot of attention while others 
are abandoned. In communities with a lot of attention, some projects inadvertently provide 
benefits that discourage people from participating in other projects. For instance, a development 
practitioner narrated the case of a project that consisted of multiplying seeds. The technician 
would give 25 pounds of seeds to each beneficiary, expecting them to produce a hundredweight 
of seeds after harvesting. Beneficiaries were required to return 25 pounds of seeds to the agency, 
and they could keep the other 75 pounds of seeds for themselves. The plan was to use the 
returned seeds to repeat the cycle in other communities. Beneficiaries agreed to such terms, until 
another agency started distributing seeds without asking for anything in return. As beneficiaries 
became unwilling to give seeds back, the project was discontinued. When beneficiaries receive 
similar projects simultaneously, smaller agencies unable to offer better benefits have much to 
lose. Among all narratives of competing projects, I found one case in which competition for 
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beneficiaries was a deliberate attempt to foster the failure of a particular project for political 
reasons. 
We were able to work with COCODES7 in some places, but not in others. I remember we 
would go to a community and learned they had a COCODE. We would tell people, “it is 
important to talk about land tenure” and we would agree to meet on Tuesday at 2:00. But 
when we arrived on Tuesday, there was nobody [ready to meet us] at the community. 
What is going on [we thought]? We went to look for the president of the COCODE and 
he would tell us, “but you guys said we would meet at 8! I am sorry; I made a mistake”. It 
was kind of a weird response, but we would agree to meet at 10:00 another day, and at 
9:45 we received a phone call [from the COCODE saying] “we need to attend a meeting 
with another agency and we cannot meet you today.” Then we visited a number of 
households [to ask what was going on] and we found that the COCODE was not inviting 
the community to our meetings because other agencies had told them not to attend our 
meetings. That kind of thing has happened, and continues to happen. 
 
Intentionally or not, competition over numbers of beneficiaries has much to do with an 
agency’s reputation relative to others. Agencies with past expensive projects signal to donors that 
they are capable of managing large amounts of funding. Even though most projects are short-
term and cheap, donors prefer to work with agencies that have implemented very expensive 
projects in the past, assuming they have better accountability practices. 
International cooperation has changed their interest in the area and many [donors] have 
left. We get small projects from those who have remained here. For instance, Spain. I 
have not seen USAID lately in this sector. And I feel like agencies like World Vision, the 
German Cooperation, the World Bank, and BID… they are way too interested in 
partnering with municipal governments. They do not see us as their potential partners. 
(…) 
 
Donors favor interventions backed up by the local government, and prefer to give funding 
to agencies that have spent large amounts of money in the past. We have found it difficult 
to find funding because international donors are looking for that partnership with the 
government, and it is hard for us. Why? Because there are too many injustices happening 
in municipalities. (…) The project we have right now ends this year, and we have 
                                               
7 COCODE stands for Community Development Council (Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo). 
COCODE are democratically elected leaders that represent their communities at departmental committees 
for decision-making, which establish budget spending priorities. Since 2002, the Guatemalan state legally 
recognizes and supports them as part of the System of Councils for Urban and Rural Development.  
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knocked on doors but cannot find funding. [Donors prefer to work with other agencies 
because] they have spent millions and millions in the past and we have barely managed a 
budget of one or two million.  
Overall, competition over quicker results, beneficiaries, or donors has not made agencies 
better able to implement development interventions. Despite adding extra pressure to 
development practitioners, competition allows some agencies to keep growing, while others 
loose funding and disappear. What is more, agencies have become unwilling to work with one 
another due to past experiences of rivalry. A context of gossip and mutual vigilance governs the 
local network of development interventions and further polarizes local actors. During my 
fieldwork, I learned about one initiative directly trying to address the lack of coordination among 
agencies, but it failed due to asymmetries among agencies. 
In 2005 I belonged to the Network of Cooperation of Chiquimula and became the 
coordinator, but we could barely work because we found limits in the dynamics of 
several agencies. The network was an effort to make alliances among agencies through 
SEGEPLAN8. We would meet once a month, alternating offices as a strategy to integrate 
efforts. We wanted to make a map of interventions to make sure there was no duplicity of 
efforts, and we wanted to have more projects where there was little concentration. We 
wanted development to be more balanced. It was a voluntary effort. I put a lot of effort on 
it, but agencies with more funding collaborated less than agencies with little funding. We 
asked them to pay for a secretary and to pay for the costs of coordinating among 
agencies, but they did not want to. 
 
In short, one big obstacle for challenging structural causes of food scarcity is that funding 
fluctuation fosters competing short-term projects unable to seek structural changes. While trying 
to find a solution that fixes all the problems of the region, and without fully understanding the 
complex set of social arrangements that explain structural causes of food scarcity, development 
practitioners prioritize institutional needs and compete for funding or beneficiaries.   
                                               
8 SEGEPLAN stands for Presidential Secretary of Planification and Planning (Secretaría de Planificación 
y Programación de la Presidencia), and it is a governmental office in charge of planning and coordinating 
budget for development projects between municipalities and central government. It was established in 
1991 together with other decentralization policies. 
40 
SLICING DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES LIKE A CAKE 
 
The project had goods: financial resources and infrastructure. When the project 
was about to end, about a year before it ended, people started thinking ‘hey, there 
is machinery (trucks, tractors, etc.), some money intended for institutional 
strengthening, and a flotilla of cars and motorcycles’. Everybody was thinking, 
‘who is going to keep all that?’. A struggle began. (…) X agency inherited some 
goods, but not all of them, because the Ministry of Agriculture wanted to keep the 
vehicles for their municipal branches. Mayors kept the machinery. In short, there 
was a distribution of stuff. Although the distribution was more or less even, goods 
were not intended to be distributed at all: they are not a cake! But they [people 
who agreed to distribute goods] were trying to overcome a potential division 
between agencies… a division that nevertheless exists until today. 
 
I found that the resources practitioners have at their disposal have sometimes been 
contingent upon whether politicians or donors benefit from a portion of the budget. While 
development practitioners are required to account for every penny they spend, they have 
observed politicians using funding for political purposes and donors establishing spending 
requirements that benefit industries connected to them. From the perspective of the development 
practitioners I interviewed, both politicians and donors engaging in such distribution of 
development resources are ‘slicing a cake piece of cake for themselves’ through legal or illegal 
mechanisms. Beyond preventing agencies from better channeling resources more effectively, 
such cases send a strong message about who may decide what to do with development resources 
and who is able to account for such decisions. 
Getting Political Support 
 
Development practitioners I interviewed have observed that politicians channel projects 
to beneficiaries in their political party or who are willing to vote for them. Most development 
practitioners I interviewed mentioned that the COCODE system does not work well in the 
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Ch’orti’ Maya area because leaders are oftentimes elected by the mayors rather than by their 
communities, and mayors’ principal criterion for electing them is their support during 
campaigns. Thus, COCODES often do not represent their communities and are obstacles, not 
enhancers, of development. 
Sometimes, lack of education9 has made committees of rural representatives vulnerable to 
manipulation, such that they have ‘willingly’ allowed politicians to use funding for their political 
purposes. According to one of my interviewees, the Guatemalan government had acquired a loan 
to provide credits to farmers in the Ch’orti’ Maya area when PROZACHI was over. The loan 
was worth more than 40 million Guatemalan quetzales, and a credit committee integrated by 
community representatives was in charge of deciding how to dispense it. According to my 
informants, politicians manipulated community representatives into signing an agreement that 
would allow the Ministry of Agriculture to use the loan to provide credits to farmers in the whole 
country (not only Eastern Guatemala), and instead of benefitting small farmers the credits started 
benefiting big producers. Eventually, the credit committee lost its power to decide what to do 
with the loan. Unfair as it seemed for my informants, everything had been done legally and there 
was no way to hold the Ministry of Agriculture accountable. The big mistake had been for the 
committee members to sign the agreements the Ministry of Agriculture prepared. 
In short, even though the COCODE system law provides for representatives of rural 
communities to participate in decision-making about development issues that affect them, and 
despite the fact that community leaders have experience managing development funds, 
politicians have appropriated funding for political purposes. Not only is their selection of 
                                               
9 Metz (personal communication) found that in the 1990s that the average education of Ch’orti’ adults 
was one year of schooling, just enough to learn minimal literacy. 
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beneficiaries corrupt, they also sometimes hire employees based on political or personal 
connections. Indeed, many of my interviewees suggested that municipal offices hired more 
people than necessary in order to provide jobs for supporters, including to family or friends that 
will give them financial kickbacks. One local development practitioner mentioned: 
Unfortunately, and despite the law says that 90% of municipal spending should be used 
as investment and 10% should be used for administrative costs, funding is used the other 
way around. They employ too many people! Every municipal government hires a group 
of people who participated in their campaign, and as a consequence our municipalities 
operate with around 700 employees.  
 
I asked whether a similar situation occurred in local NGOs, and they replied, 
[In some NGOs] administrative costs are 70% of the budget, and investment is only 30%. 
In Guatemala City, they have nice offices and people make good money. We do not even 
dream of those salaries! Yes, they [NGOs] offer a lot of jobs for technicians, but the big 
employer is still the municipality (…). 
 
While no one could offer exact numbers of people benefitted by corruption, the 
percentages mentioned by local development practitioners during interviews are noteworthy. 
From their perspective, municipalities use employment as a means for attaining political support 
more often than NGOs. NGOs, in turn, are known for providing jobs with better salaries, which 
seems unfair to some local development workers. One reason a good salary seems unfair is that 
development practitioners, and specially those with lower positions as technicians, are required 
to account for every penny they spend. They often buy the cheapest lunches when planning an 
activity or workshop, use the cheapest means for transportation to the communities, and still end 
up ‘paying from their pocket’ after misunderstanding onerous accountability measures. The need 
for accounting all expenses through very specific methods is a result of international agencies 
emphasizing greater transparency and placing restrictions on project spending procedures.  
Establishing Spending Requirements 
43 
 
USAID donates $520 million to Guatemala. You could do anything you wanted 
with that kind of money! But they also require you to buy 50 Cherokee Jeep, pay 
15 or 20 PhDs with great salaries, etc. What trickles down to communities is very 
little! – Local Development Practitioner 
 
Donors are the first to decide how development funding will be spent. According to 
development practitioners I interviewed, when donors place spending requirements, such as a set 
of cars or the importation of aid goods, they sometimes cut significant portions of funding that 
could be used for more important purposes. What is more, when donors establish spending 
requirements onto projects, they often benefit industries in their national economies rather than 
local economies.  
If they need to buy fumigating pumps, they import them. They do not buy them from 
local businesses. (…) Sometimes the donor says, “you need to buy things made in this 
place,” It happens with some donors more than with others. If you go to X agency, for 
instance, you will find Land Rovers because their donor is the European Union, and you 
will find Nissan vehicles that are usually not imported to Guatemala. They were imported 
exclusively for the project! 
 
When talking about donors benefiting industries in their domestic economies, one of my 
informants talked about a project called T510, funded by USAID, which intended to improve 
water systems and incentivize competition among producers interested in exporting their 
watermelons and melons. He suggested that, although it was framed as a development 
intervention aiming to help small producers, the real purpose of the project was to sell the 
melons and watermelons to a grocery store in the US. He mentioned: 
After sending 15 containers of melon and watermelon to the United States, after working 
for six months, beneficiaries ended up loosing money. We had hired two foreign trade 
advisers, paid by USAID. We had agriculture engineers specialized in production, and we 
organized workshops to prepare all the U.S. requisites to import food. We also provided 
credits for water systems, but out of all the beneficiaries that were involved in the project, 
I did not meet a single one who made profit from it. 
 
After hearing various cases of ‘slicing a cake piece of cake for themselves’, I asked 
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development practitioners whether there was something they could do about it. They mentioned 
that there was a lot of impunity regarding what politicians did with development funding, and 
international transparency procedures did not provide much hope either. One development 
worker I interviewed mentioned that the World Bank usually requires too many accountability 
measures and procedures “except in this case.” He said an NGO received $11,000 to invest in 
tourism. Although the project produced some plans, maps, and routes at the beginning, they 
simply stopped investing the money the way they had promised. The development worker telling 
the story was interested in investing in tourism and took extra steps in finding out what had 
happened to the project. An employee from the World Bank told him that only 34% of the 
money had been spent in 4 years, and the project was about to be over in a few months. In the 
meantime, the NGO was ‘entertaining people with workshops’ but without making any real 
investment. One intended beneficiary of the project wanted to report the anomalies to the 
transparency unit of the World Bank in Washington, but it reneged on its promises to investigate 
and punish the NGO. 
In short, I found that the resources practitioners have at their disposal have sometimes 
been contingent upon the benefits politicians or donors get from development projects. While 
development practitioners are required to account for every penny they spend, they have 
observed politicians using funding to attain political support and donors establishing spending 
requirements that benefit industries in their national economies. When politicians or donors help 
themselves to a slice of the development cake, they inhibit projects from challenging structural 
causes of food scarcity because communities’ needs are once again deprioritized. What is worse, 
such cases (even if they do not occur frequently) send messages about who may decide what to 
do with development resources and who is able to account for such decisions. As development 
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practitioners reinforce the idea that politicians and donors appropriate development resources, 
they become frustrated and discouraged to try new strategies for changing the structural causes 
of food scarcity.  
46 
UNDERSTANDING FUNDING ALLOCATION MECHANISMS OF THE 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRY 
 
The issue is that there is no easy way out. Real solutions are expensive and must 
be implemented in the long term – Development Practitioner 
 
Funding fluctuation is probably the biggest obstacle development projects encounter for 
challenging structural causes of food scarcity in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. To survive, development 
agencies must prioritize winning funding over beneficiaries’ needs. In addition, competition for 
funding and beneficiaries pits local development agencies against each other and prevents them 
from collaborating or coordinating efforts. What is worse, funding is sometimes contingent on 
politicians or donors benefitting. Although development practitioners have attempted to provide 
solutions to food scarcity, development projects have only treated the symptoms –but not the 
causes– of structural violence in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. 
The case of the Ch’orti’ Maya area suggests that allocating development resources 
through competitive biding does not offer promising avenues for breaking structural cycles of 
food scarcity. In a context where agencies get funding through competitive bidding, donor 
allocation does not only determine which agency gets to implement which project; more funding 
availability expands the local service economy, while decreasing funding fosters competition 
among agencies. As a result, development practitioners prioritize institutional needs and the 
interests of politicians and donors over attending beneficiaries’ needs. Indeed, the market-
oriented allocation of resources, despite more accountability measures and transparency 
mechanisms, lacks mechanisms to promote long-term results, incentivize collaboration, or 
prevent donors’ and politicians’ interests to prevail. 
 That is not to say development projects would work perfectly if only resources were 
allocated in regards to population needs. On the contrary, even in ideal conditions, development 
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projects would continue to face a variety of challenges throughout implementation processes. 
What I mean to say is that development practitioners find it next to impossible to prioritize 
communities’ needs in the context of funding uncertainty. Similarly, although I acknowledge that 
practitioners have made efforts to propose more holistic, long-term solutions, I would not argue 
that all NGO directors or technicians know exactly how to break the cycle of structural violence 
in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. In fact, some practitioners are better than others at assessing needs and 
adapting strategies accordingly. Rather, I discovered that the market-oriented allocation of 
development resources lacks mechanisms to promote long-term results and serves the interests of 
politicians and donors. Indeed, the market-oriented allocation of resources has produced shorter 
and narrower time horizons, as well as more but smaller projects in the Ch’orti’ Maya area since 
the 1990s. Indeed, although there is increasing concentration of funding in larger NGOs, they are 
probably implementing more projects (as opposed to one single project). How is the current 
funding allocation mechanism different from previous contexts of development in the region? 
New Allocation Mechanisms, New Challenges 
 
Project proliferation in the Ch’orti’ Maya area has consolidated a local network of 
development practitioners facing particular challenges due to funding insecurity. Just as the Cold 
War ideology and the Guatemalan Armed Conflict guided a top-down, large-scale approach to 
development from the 1940s to the 1980s, current development practices are also shaped largely 
by foreign donors, although with a more diverse set of issues in mind. Before funding gets to the 
Ch’orti’ Maya area, and before local NGOs even apply for donor money, donors establish a set 
of filters that determine how development funding is allocated globally. For instance, the World 
Bank establishes income group thresholds and the OECD prioritizes ‘aid orphan’ countries. 
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Additionally, donor nations decide to allocate funding in regards to issues of human rights, 
peace, democracy, transparency, and, ultimately, economic stability. For instance, a variety of 
donors invested in development projects in Guatemala for as long as the peace process lasted, but 
many donors decided to divert funding to Africa to compete with attention from China in the mid 
2000s. In short, donors sometimes allocate funding to areas of the greatest need, and sometimes 
they allocate funding based on other factors. 
Whether donors realize it or not, deciding how to allocate funding for development 
greatly impacts networks of development in the local sphere. Beyond determining which agency 
will implement which project, donors foster the emergence of service economies when funding is 
abundant. In turn, they foster competition when funding decreases. Indeed, competition among 
agencies is a reflection of funding allocation patterns promoted by the global development 
industry. Though partnered countries share general goals, donors allocate funding according to 
independent criteria. Ultimately, international aid distribution is more competitive than 
complementary and coordinated. 
Asymmetries among development partners also re-shape development practices. First, 
local stereotypes of indigeneity have changed as agencies have been dancing to the rhythm of 
‘hot development topics’. Although discrimination against indigenous peoples has been part of 
Guatemalan history for centuries, development practitioners and other local actors have started 
adopting new perspectives about indigeneity from the global development industry. One 
traditional stereotype of indigeneity in Guatemala used to be that the abandonment of Ch’orti’ 
culture is a necessary step for transforming peasants into an educated and professional 
population (Metz 2008). In contrast, most development agencies today assume indigenous 
communities are naturally united and have a well-defined culture amenable to development. As 
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projects assume idyllic, harmonious, well-functioning indigenous communities, development 
practitioners often take for granted community unification and willingness to collaborate. They 
do not recognize that communities are extremely vulnerable and internally unequal (Metz, 
Mariano and López García 2010). 
Second, the global development industry established very specific accounting methods 
for all expenses in their efforts to emphasize greater transparency. In the Ch’orti’ Maya area, 
restrictions on project spending have affected development practitioners, especially those with 
lower positions such as technicians, because they spend much of their time accounting for every 
penny they spend. In turn, mayors accused of corruption by development workers do not seem to 
be affected, nor punished, by such mechanisms. The development industry would greatly benefit 
from adopting more effective transparency mechanisms that prevent politicians from benefitting 
from development funding, while streamlining accounting procedures for technicians. 
Finally, fluctuating funding has fostered an unstable economy of development services in 
a region with no viable industrial base and very little tourism. The careers available at the high 
school and undergraduate level in Chiquimula are often related to development: agronomy, 
social work, and technical training in sustainable development. As a result, many local 
development workers have the same degree in the same discipline, and the means for 
differentiating their preparation and level of experience are blurry. In addition, while NGOs have 
found themselves unable to provide the same number of jobs they have provided in the past, 
local politicians sometimes offer more jobs than they need within governmental offices in order 
to attain political support, but no money to actually implement anything. Even though it is 
difficult to speculate whether unemployment will be an issue in the near future or not, decreasing 
funding certainly challenges the stability of the local economy of development services. 
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Implications for Literature 
 
This research contributes to the body of literature aiming to document the proliferation of 
development projects in Guatemala. The case of the Ch’orti’ Maya area is another example of 
how the expansion of the global development industry, neoliberal economic policies in 
Guatemala, and the Peace Process have fostered the proliferation of disconnected development 
projects since the 1990s. As scholars have found in Sololá (Rohloff, Kraemer Díaz and Dasgupta 
2011) and Totonicapán (DeHart 2009), I found that NGOs rarely collaborate with one another 
and do not trigger long-term results in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. Also, I found that the situation of 
abundance and multiplicity of projects of the 1990s has begun to change, because the current 
context of development is characterized by decreasing and fluctuating funding. Scholars may 
continue to study development and NGOs in Guatemala by asking what happens with local 
networks of development when funding dries up. 
Second, this research contributes to the body of literature aiming to understand the inner 
workings of the global development industry. Like other ethnographers of aid, I found that 
agencies unevenly deliver project benefits to pad their portfolios. Chambers (2008) writes of ‘the 
showpiece of rural development tourism’, a “nicely groomed pet project or model village, 
specially staffed and supported, with well briefed members who know what to say and which is 
sited a reasonable but not excessive distance from the urban headquarters.” In the Ch’orti’ Maya 
area, development practitioners have identified particular beneficiaries who have in the past 
taken more advantage of projects than others. They sometimes deliberately invest more in such 
good bets in their attempts to produce cases of project success. 
Ethnographers of aid have also found gaps between stated goals of development and 
actual implementation processes (Lewis and Moose 2006, Rossi 2004), and they have suggested 
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that the actual role of development policy is to legitimize development practice rather than to 
plan future interventions (Arvidson 2004). Mosse (2004) writes: 
But what if development practice is not driven by policy? What if the things that make 
for good policy are quite different from those that make it implementable? What if the 
practices of development are in fact concealed rather than produced by policy? What if, 
instead of policy producing practice, practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in 
development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of 
events? 
 
Like Arvidson (2004) and Mosse (2004), I found that the incorporation of new 
approaches does not guarantee innovation of strategies in the Ch’orti’ Maya area, because there 
is a disconnect between policy and practice. As a result, agencies sometimes replicate old recipes 
that do not work. Whereas development policies do not dictate practice, funding allocation 
mechanisms determine the structure (size, scope, and limitations) and priorities of development 
projects. 
Finally, this research contributes to the body of literature aiming to understand patterns of 
structural violence. Ch’orti’ people suffer structural violence because racism, ethnic 
discrimination, and social inequalities at the national and regional level have historically 
privileged others while placing them at a disadvantage. The global development industry does 
not provide the tools to engage in changing historical patters of structural violence because the 
market-oriented allocation of resources imposes priorities on development practitioners 
(institutional needs, competition, and donors’ and politicians’ interests) that diverge from 
populations’ needs. As a result, while Ch’orti’ families receive benefits from development 
projects, they continue to suffer labor exploitation and state neglect. Although some cases of 
periodic chronic food shortages have received attention and some cases of premature death have 
been prevented, many positive initiatives have been discontinued when funding dries up. 
On the other hand, the local network of development professionals shares the same racial 
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and ethnic differentiations that explain other inequalities in Guatemalan society, and reflects 
many contradictions and paradoxes of structural violence. While agencies have provided jobs for 
many people in the Ch’orti’ region, few indigenous peoples have access to the training and 
networks that will lead them to hold a position in a local development agency. Most development 
practitioners are Ladinos, and some of them share the discriminatory ideas and attitudes other 
‘people from the town’ have toward ‘people from the aldeas’. Along the same lines, while 
indigenous peoples continue to lack true representation via COCODEs and have restricted access 
to political participation, mayors benefit from development funding before project beneficiaries 
do.  
In short, development projects do not challenge structural violence in the Ch’orti’ Maya 
area, and the local development network reflects some of the inequalities that explain structural 
violence in Guatemalan society. That is not to say development projects have made Ch’orti’ 
people poor. On the contrary, Ch’orti’ people have been suffering structural violence for 
centuries before the implementation of development projects in the region. What is more, 
environmental degradation, population growth, and labor exploitation also contribute to 





While there has been an entire anthropological industry devoted to deconstructing the 
development industry or making projects more effective, I have found no studies of how local 
development agencies and their personnel operate in relationship to each other, donors, and the 
intended beneficiaries. After analyzing such relationships, I found that the proliferation of 
disarticulated interventions in the Ch’orti’ Maya area is a reflection of the market-oriented 
allocation of resources of the global development industry. Although current development 
interventions are less linked to geopolitical interests than a few decades ago, asymmetries among 
donors and recipients still create inequalities, lead to misunderstandings, and allow actors to 
pursue political and economic self-interests by manipulating development funding. Asymmetries 
among development partners explain why, despite practitioners’ efforts to provide solutions to 
food scarcity, development projects have only treated the symptoms of food scarcity in the 
Ch’orti’ Maya area. To survive, development practitioners must place the pursuit of funding over 
beneficiaries’ needs. In addition, competition for funding and beneficiaries polarizes local 
development agencies, and prevents them from collaborating with each other or coordinating 
efforts. What is worse, resources development practitioners have at their disposal are sometimes 
contingent upon the benefits politicians or donors get from interventions.  
As in most industries governed by market competition, in development ‘you get what you 
pay for.’ When donors select agencies or projects based solely on cost, they inhibit agencies 
from prioritizing local population needs. The global development industry needs to acknowledge 
the inequalities that occur throughout project implementation processes and come up with 
strategies to foster more long-term results. More importantly, in order to change structural causes 
of food scarcity, the global development industry should find mechanisms to prioritize 
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beneficiaries’ needs. For instance, the development industry would greatly benefit from adopting 
more effective transparency mechanisms that prevent politicians from benefitting from 
development funding, while facilitating accountability procedures technicians engage in. 
Finally, fluctuating funding has fostered an unstable economy of development services in 
a region with no viable industrial base and very little tourism. While NGOs have found 
themselves unable to provide the same amount of jobs they have provided in the past, local 
politicians sometimes offer more jobs than necessary for political patronage. Overall, 
development projects’ inability to address structural causes of food scarcity reflects some of the 
multiple inequalities that shape structural violence in the Ch’orti’ Maya area. While Ch’orti’ 
families are increasingly subject to decisions made by international development agencies, local 
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